This paper introduces a cryptographic protocol for efficiently aggregating a count of unique items across a set of data parties privately -that is, without exposing any information other than the count. Our protocol allows for more secure and useful statistics gathering in privacy-preserving distributed systems such as anonymity networks; for example, it allows operators of anonymity networks such as Tor to securely answer the questions: how many unique users are using the distributed service? and how many hidden services are being accessed? We formally prove the correctness and security of our protocol in the Universal Composability framework against an active adversary that compromises all but one of the aggregation parties. We also show that the protocol provides security against adaptive corruption of the data parties, which prevents them from being victims of targeted compromise. To ensure safe measurements, we also show how the output can satisfy differential privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Gathering statistics is a critical component of understanding how distributed systems are used and/or misused. In privacy-preserving distributed systems, such as anonymity networks, the statisticsgathering process is complicated by the system's privacy requirements. Naïvely recording statistics poses significant risks to the system's users and the use of such techniques [37] has been widely * Co-first authors Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of the United States government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only. debated [46] . Ideally, the statistics should be gathered privatelythat is, nothing should be learned other than the statistic itself.
In the setting of anonymous communication, several recent papers have suggested methods of computing aggregate statistics at a quantifiable cost to anonymity. The PrivEx system of Elahi et al. [19] uses differential privacy [15] to privately collect statistics about the Tor network [14] . PrivCount [30] , which we extend in this work, improves upon PrivEx by offering multi-phase iterative measurements while offering an optimal allocation of the ϵ privacy budget. Historϵ [36] is also inspired by PrivEx and uses histogram-based queries to provide integrity guarantees by bounding the influence of malicious data contributors.
While these secure measurement techniques significantly raise the bar for safe measurements in anonymity networks, they lack the ability to perform counts of distinct values among the data owners. For example, PrivEx, PrivCount, and Historϵ can answer the question-how many clients were observed entering the Tor network?-but cannot discern what fraction of the result constitutes unique clients. That is, they cannot answer the (perhaps) more useful question of how many unique clients were observed on Tor?
We refer to the problem of counting the number of unique values across data owners as private set-union cardinality. More formally, private set-union cardinality answers how many unique items are recorded across a set of Data Parties (DPs) while preserving the privacy of the inputs. Specifically, if there are d DPs and each DP k contains a set of of zero or more items I k , we want to know | ∪ d k =1
I k | without exposing any element of any item set to an active adversary. In instances where exact counts may reveal sensitive information, private set-union cardinality may naturally be combined with differential privacy to provide noisy answers.
Motivation. Private set-union cardinality is useful in many settings. For example, in the context of anonymity networks, it can determine how many unique users participate in the service, how many unique users connect via a particular version of client software, and how many unique destinations are contacted. Maintainers of anonymity networks can also use private set-union cardinality to determine how users regularly connect to the network (e.g., over mobile connections, through proxies, etc.) and how the network is used (e.g., the length of time that users spend on the network in a single session).
For structured overlay networks such as Chord [47] , private setunion cardinality can determine the number of unique clients in the network and the number of unique lookups, without exposing users' identities.
For the web, private set-union cardinality can serve as a building block to determine the number of shared users among several sites, without revealing those users' identifiers.
More generally, private set-union cardinality allows researchers and administrators of distributed systems to better understand how such systems are being accessed and used. It enables system designers to make informed, data-driven decisions about their systems based on actual usage safely when privacy is required.
A protocol for private set-union cardinality. The primary contribution of this paper is a private set-union cardinality protocol that we call PSC. We formally prove the correctness and security of PSC in the Universally Composable (UC) framework [6] , ensuring that PSC is secure when (arbitrarily) composed with other instances of PSC and/or other UC protocols. PSC is robust against adaptive attacks against the DPs, so that if an adversary compromises a DP mid-collection, he learns only data collected post-compromise. The protocol is largely carried out by a set of Computation Parties (CPs) expected to be smaller than the set of DPs, and the protocol remains secure as long as at least one CP remains honest.
We additionally introduce an implementation of PSC, released as open-source software written in memory-safe Go. To achieve greater efficiency, our implementation uses some subprotocols that are not proven UC-secure, such as a verifiable shuffle [40] that is more practical than verifiable shuffles proven secure in the UC model (verifiable shuffles are explained in the next section). With these subprotocols, our implementation can still be proven secure in the classical (i.e. standalone) model and, as we demonstrate via at-scale evaluation experiments, incurs only moderate bandwidth and computation costs and can be practically deployed.
BACKGROUND
Before describing PSC, we briefly review some concepts and background that are necessary for understanding our algorithm.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy [15] is a privacy definition that offers provable and quantifiable privacy of database queries. Differential privacy guarantees that the query responses look nearly the same regardless of whether or not the input of any one user is included in the database. Thus anything that is learned from the queries is learned independently of the inclusion of any single user's data [31] . Several mechanisms have been designed to provide differential privacy while maximizing accuracy [3, 16, 38, 42] .
More formally, an (ϵ, δ )-differentially-private mechanism is an algorithm M such that, for all datasets D 1 and D 2 that differ only on the input of one user, and all S ⊆ Range(M), the following holds:
(1) ϵ and δ quantify the amount of privacy provided by the mechanism, where smaller values of each indicate more privacy. Dwork [15] proves that binomial noise, that is, the sum of n uniformly random binary values, provides (ϵ, δ )-differential privacy for queries that each user can affect by at most one when n ≥ 64 ln(2/δ ) ϵ 2
Eq. 2 presents a trade-off between privacy and utility, an issue inherent to differential privacy. Put alternatively, for the privacy level given by ϵ and δ , Eq. 2 yields the amount of binomial noise that is required to be added to the output of a query that each user can change by at most one. In this paper, we use this binomial noise technique to achieve differential privacy.
Discrete-log zero-knowledge proofs. PSC uses a few types of zeroknowledge proofs demonstrating knowledge of and relationships among the discrete logarithms of certain values. The values are elements in some group G of order q, and the discrete logs are with respect to some generator д (e.g. x is the discrete log of y = д x , x ∈ Z q ). In general, a zero-knowledge proof system [25] is a protocol between a prover P and verifier V in which the prover demonstrates the truth of some statement without revealing more than that truth, where the statement may be, for example, the existence or knowledge of a witness to membership in a language. Sigma protocols exist for the discrete-log statements PSC proves in zero-knowledge, where sigma protocols are three-phase interactive protocols starting with a commitment by the prover, followed by a random challenge from the verifier, and ended by a response from the prover. Such protocols can be made non-interactive via the the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [21] , in which the random challenge is generated by the prover by applying a cryptographic hash to the commitment, and which is secure in the random-oracle model.
Verifiable shuffles. PSC makes use of verifiable shuffles [41] . Informally, a verifiable re-encryption shuffle takes as input ciphertexts, outputs a permutation of a re-encryption of those ciphertexts, and proves that the output is a re-encryption and permutation of the input. There are two security requirements for verifiable shuffles: privacy and verifiability. Privacy requires an honest shuffle to protect its secret permutation. Verifiability requires that any attempt by a malicious shuffle to produce an incorrect output must be detectable. Several protocols for verifiable shuffling have been proposed [2, 23, 27, 40] . As with the discrete-log proofs, the verifiable shuffles with interactive proofs can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
Secure broadcast. PSC uses a secure broadcast communication functionality. The security property that we require is broadcast with abort [26] , which is slightly weaker than Byzantine agreement. This property guarantees that there exists some consensus output x such that each honest party that terminates either outputs x or aborts. Note that some honest parties may output x while others may abort. Broadcast with abort can be achieved given a PKI with the two-round echo-broadcast protocol. In this protocol, the sender sends a signed message to all the receivers, and each receiver append its own signature and sends it to all other receivers. If a party received the same message in every case and with valid signatures, it accepts that message, and otherwise it aborts.
OVERVIEW
PSC enables the secure computation of the cardinality of the union of itemsets that are distributed among a set of Data Parties (DPs). The protocol has two phases:
During the data collection phase, the DPs record observations in a vector of encrypted counters. These observations correspond to the metric of interest -for example, the unique clients observed by guard (entrance) relays in an anonymity network, or the unique exit points observed by the network's egress points. As explained below, the counters are maintained in an oblivious manner, meaning that their plaintext cannot be revealed, even by the DPs that maintain them.
After the data has been collected, the aggregation phase proceeds as a series of cryptographic operations that, in toto, produces the cardinality of the union of the DPs' observations.
For clarity, the operation of these two phases is summarized below. The full details are found in Section 4.
Participants and threat model. The participants in the system are the d DPs and m Computation Parties (CPs). The latter are dedicated servers that apply verifiable shuffles and other cryptographic techniques to enable PSC.
Informally, our privacy guarantees are that (i) no information from an honest DP is ever exposed and (ii) the adversary cannot identify any individual data from the aggregated result (i.e. the cardinality). Formal security definitions and guarantees are provided in Section 5. Our protocol is secure as long as there is at least one honest CP. That is, we tolerate malicious DPs and CPs so long as at least one CP correctly obeys the protocol and the malicious CPs are selected statically. We prove our protocol secure in the UC framework, ensuring that PSC can be safely composed with other UC protocols.
Our protocol is not robust against dishonest DPs that report invalid statistics or dishonest CPs that choose to insert specific elements into the counted itemset. That is, like PrivEx [19] and PrivCount [30] , PSC does not provide integrity guarantees that limit the influence of invalid data supplied by the malicious parties. We also note that a malicious CP can disrupt the protocol. We do not attempt to prevent malicious nodes from causing the protocol to abort.
Data collection phase and encrypted counters. Each DP maintains its dataset as a vector of encrypted counters. We assume a mapping between possible values in the DPs' itemsets and some finite range of integers. This mapping may be trivially realized by hashing the itemsets' values. More concretely, let H be a hash function that maps itemset values to integers in the range [0, b − 1]. Conceptually, each DP stores a b-bit encrypted bit vector, where an encrypted 1 indicates that the DP has the corresponding item in its itemset.
An important property of our system -and one that is shared in existing work on privacy-preserving measurement systems [19, 30, 36] -is that the counters be stored obliviously. That is, after an initialization step, the DPs discard the keys used to encrypt the counters. They do, however, have the ability to transform any element in their encrypted counter to an (encrypted) 1, regardless of its previous (and unknowable) value. This construction allows the DPs to update the counters (e.g., to log the observation of a new client IP address) while maintaining resistance to compulsion attacks. That is, even under pressure to do so (e.g. in the form of a subpoena), DPs cannot release the plaintext of their encrypted counters.
Aggregation phase. During the aggregation phase, the DPs forward their encrypted counters to the CPs, which in turn perform a series of steps to securely compute the cardinality of the union.
In more detail, the aggregation phase proceeds as follows:
( This process is summarized in Figure 1 and described more fully next.
PROTOCOL DETAILS 4.1 Preliminaries
PSC makes use of several cryptographic tools. A primary tool is ElGamal encryption [20] , and PSC takes advantage of several capabilities of ElGamal, including distributed key generation and decryption, re-encryption, plaintext randomization, and multiplicative homomorphism. Let G be a Diffie-Hellman group for use by the ElGamal cryptosystem. Let q be the order of G, and let д be a generator of G. Let x R ← S denote a uniform random sample x from set S. In ElGamal, a keypair (x, y) is generated by choosing a private key x R ← Z q and setting the public key to y = д x . A message m ∈ G, r is encrypted by choosing r R ← Z q and producing the ciphertext
is re-encrypted by choosing randomization parameter r R ← Z q and producing (д r c 1 , y r c 2 ), which is an encryption of the same plaintext. A ciphertext is re-randomized by choosing a randomization parameter r R ← Z * q and producing (c r 1 , c r 2 ), which, if the original encrypted value is x д 0 , makes the value uniformly random in G\{д 0 }, and otherwise doesn't change it.
We assume that PSC has access to two secure communication primitives as ideal functionalities (see details in Appendix A). The first is a secure point-to-point communication functionality F SC that delivers messages from one party to another with confidentiality and authenticity. Such functionality can be realized using standard assumptions, even in the Universally Composable (UC) framework [6] . The second is a secure broadcast-with-abort functionality F BC that guarantees that the same message is delivered to all honest parties that don't abort. Goldwasser and Lindell [26] show how such a functionality can be implemented, including in the UC model. Details can be found in Appendix A.5.
We also provide PSC with the following functionalities for zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge, which output 1 if the inputs verify and output 0 otherwise (details in Appendix A):
(1) Discrete log (F ZKP-DL ): For input (д, y) from the verifier, the prover inputs x such that д x = y. This is defined in more detail in Appendix A.3.
from the verifier, the prover inputs x such that д x 1 = y 1 ∧д x 2 = y 2 . This is defined in more detail in Appendix A.4. d 2 ), the prover inputs re-encryption parameter r 1 and re-randomization parameter r 2 such that
. This is defined in more detail in Appendix A.1. 
, the prover inputs permutation π and re-encryption parameters (r 1 , . . . , r k ) such that
. This is defined in more detail in Appendix A.2
The Schnorr proof [44] provides an efficient sigma protocol for F ZKP-DL , and the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [9] provides efficient sigma protocols for F ZKP-DLE and F ZKP-RR . Hazay and Nissim [28] describe how to compile these (and sigma protocols in general) into efficient protocols secure in the UC model. Several zero-knowledge proofs of ElGamal shuffles of increasing efficiency have been presented [2, 23, 27, 40] (some require an honest verifier and must be strengthened for the malicious setting [24] ). Wikström [51] shows how to obtain universally-composable proofs of correct shuffling.
Initialization and Data Collection
Each Data Party DP i stores a hash table T i with b bins. Each bin is a value in Z q . Let H be the hash function used and assume that it can be modeled as a random function. If we expect at most e inputs and desire that less than a fraction f of the inputs are expected to experience a collision, then we set b = e/f to obtain the desired accuracy. To initialize each bin T i k , DP i chooses values
, uses F SC to send each r random. Such a value is non-zero with overwhelming probability (in q), and so, by interpreting a non-zero S i k to indicate an observed item, this process records the observation of item x, and S i contains the set of such observations. We note that secret sharing the bins prevents the DP from storing any sensitive local state -an adversary that gains access to a DP's state would just see a uniformly and independently random value in each bin.
At the end of data collection, DP i transfers its hash table to the CPs through additional secret sharing. That is, DP i chooses values s
, and sends each s i j k to CP j through F SC .
Aggregating Inputs
The CPs begin the secure computation process by generating ElGamal encryption keys. CP j chooses private key x j R ← Z q and broadcasts public key y j = д x j . This broadcast and all later ones are performed using F BC , and if this broadcast or any later one aborts, CP j aborts. CP j uses F ZKP-DL as the prover with each CP i as the verifier on y j to prove knowledge of x j . A group public key is computed as y = j y j .
The CPs aggregate the hash tables by adding together each share they have received for a given bin. That is, CP j computes an aggregate table A j where the kth bin contains
that is random if any DP observed an item x such that H (x) = k and is zero otherwise. Therefore, under the interpretation that a non-zero value indicates the presence of an item in the table, A k represents whether or not some DP recorded an observation in bin k (except with negligible probability in q), and A contains the union of the sets S i produced during data collection.
The CPs then prepare these aggregates for input into an ElGamal shuffle. CP j encodes the kth value as д A j k and encrypts it using public key y to produce ciphertext c j k
We place A values, and no discrete-log operation is needed later to recover the desired plaintext values because we will only need to distinguish zero and non-zero exponent values.
CP j then broadcasts c 
Noise Generation
The CPs collectively and securely generate noise inputs to provide differential privacy to the output. As discussed in Section 2, (ϵ, δ )-differential privacy can be provided to counting queries by sampling n bits uniformly at random, where n is the smallest value satisfying Inequality 2. The CPs generate such bits using verifiable ElGamal shuffles so that the resulting values are encrypted and can later be shuffled along with the encrypted inputs c k .
The CPs run in parallel n ElGamal shuffle sequences, one for each noise bit. Each shuffle sequence has two input ciphertexts, From the final output c m of the jth parallel noise shuffle we take the first element c m 0 to be the jth noise bit, which we denote c b+j .
Shuffling, Re-randomization, and Decryption
At this point, we have produced v = b+n values encoded as ElGamal ciphertexts c k , where the first b contain the aggregated bins and the last n contain the noise. To hide the values of specific bins and noise bits, we have the CPs shuffle these values before decryption. 
Optimizations
We have given the PSC protocol in a way that is clear and amenable to proving security. There are a number of practical optimizations that can be made to it. These include the following:
• During initialization, instead of having the DPs send b random values to the CPs, the DPs can just send a short random seed, and then both sets of parties can expand it using a pseudorandom generator.
• Re-encryption, re-randomization, and decryption operations can be combined, which eliminates the added rounds and messages in the final sequential decryption. This requires a zero-knowledge proof for these combined operations.
• The zero-knowledge proofs can be made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [21] .
• The noise generation phase doesn't depend on any inputs from the DPs and thus can be done in advance, for example while the DPs are collecting data.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
PSC is designed to compute set union across the DPs while maintaining strong provable security and privacy properties. As we will show, PSC is secure against an active adversary that controls all but one of the CPs. Moreover, PSC provides forward privacy, that is, an adversary that corrupts a DP at some point during data collection learns nothing about what was observed in the past. Finally, the output is differentially private, which helps hide the existence of any specific item in the set union while providing an accurate estimate of the set-union size.
Protocol Security
We prove PSC secure in the Universally Composable framework [6] . This provides a strong notion of security and allows PSC to serve as a component of a larger system without losing its security properties. Our proof is in a "hybrid" model that assumes the existence of the functionalities used in the protocol description (see Section 4). Each functionality can be instantiated using any protocol that can be proven to UC-emulate the functionality. The PSC security proof in the UC model also directly implies its security in weaker models, such as the standalone model, and thus in order to improve efficiency in implementation we can accept a weaker security model and instantiate a functionality needed by PSC using a protocol that can only be proven in the weaker model (e.g. using the Neff shuffle for F ZKP-S ). See Section 4.1 for a description of possible protocols to implement the functionalities used by PSC and their provable security properties. An ideal functionality F PSC for PSC is given in Figure 2 . Note that, in addition to the CPs and DPs, the functionality interacts with an adversary A. We will show that PSC UC-emulates F PSC against adaptive DP corruptions and static CP corruptions as long as one CP is honest. Security against adaptive corruptions is often difficult to prove with efficient protocols. However, we need adaptive security to express that nothing can be learned about past inputs by corrupting a DP, and so we allow adaptive corruptions against the DPs only.
Because PSC UC-emulates F PSC , it inherits the security properties that are satisfied by the functionality. F PSC clearly produces the noisy set-union cardinality output, although it includes the limitations that the adversary can prevent any output at all and that the adversary is able to include arbitrary entries in the set even if he only controls a CP. The latter limitation is minimal, as the function to be computed already allows a corrupt DP to provide an input containing whatever the adversary wants. We can see that the functionality provides input privacy in that an adversary doesn't learn anything other than the inputs and outputs of the corrupted parties. We can also observe that the functionality provides forward privacy for the DPs, as a DP does not reveal anything about its past inputs upon corruption. Finally, the adversary does have the power to cause honest parties to abort at will, even potentially resulting in some honest parties aborting and others terminating successfully.
We prove that PSC UC-emulates F PSC in a hybrid model using the following functionalities: F SC , F BC , F ZKP-DL , F ZKP-DLE , F ZKP-RR , F ZKP-S . See Section 4.1 for details on these functionalities. Let M be the hybrid model including these functionalities. The security claim for PSC is given in Theorem 5.1.
(1) Wait until (CORRUPT-CP, C) is received from A. For each i ∈ C, add CP i to the list of corrupted parties. (2) Upon receiving (CORRUPT-DP, i) from A, add DP i to the list of corrupted parties. Note that past inputs to DP i are not revealed to A upon corruption.
(4) Upon receiving GO from DP i , ignore further messages from DP i , and send (GO, DP i ) to A. (5) Upon receiving GO from CP i , ignore further messages from CP i , and send (GO,
(7) Sample the noise value as N ∼ Bin(n, 1/2), where Bin(n, p) is the binomial distribution with n trials and success probability p.
Once GO has been received from each CP, output z to CP m . Proof. We leave the proof to Appendix B.2. □
Protocol Privacy
PSC ensures that only the desired output is learned by an adversary, and it guarantees that the output doesn't itself violate privacy by making the output (ϵ, δ )-differentially private. The privacy notion is applied per-item; that is, the differential-privacy guarantee (see Equation 1 ) applies to two input sets that differ only in the existence of a single item. Thus the adversary cannot conclude whether or not a single item was observed by some DP. The extent to which the adversary can be made to suspect an item was observed is determined by the privacy parameters ϵ and δ . PSC can easily be configured to provide privacy for any small number k of items by reducing the ϵ and δ by a factor of k.
Implementation
We built an implementation of PSC in 1427 lines of Go using the DeDiS Advanced Crypto Library for Go package 1 . ElGamal encryption is implemented in the NIST P-256 elliptic curve group [43] and the CPs use Neff's verifiable shuffle [40] to shuffle the ElGamal ciphertexts. The CPs perform secure broadcast using the two-round echobroadcast protocol (see Section 2). They use the Schnorr signature algorithm [44] over the NIST P-256 elliptic curve for signing and SHA-256 for computing digests. We rely on TLS 1.2 to provide secure point-to-point communication.
We use "Biffle" in the DeDiS Advanced Crypto Library for shuffling the noise vectors during the noise generation phase. Biffle is a fast binary shuffle for two ciphertexts based on generic zeroknowledge proofs.
For zero-knowledge proofs, we use Schnorr proofs [44] for knowledge of discrete log of the Elgamal public key and blinding factors, the Chaum-Pedersen proof [9] for equality of discrete log of decrypted Elgamal ciphertexts and public key, and the generalization of the Chaum-Pedersen proof [40] for the ElGamal ciphertext reencryption and re-randomization. Non-interactive versions of all these proofs are produced using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [21] .
A single DP program emulates all the DPs in our implementation. However, in a real deployment, the DPs would be distributed.
To encourage the use of PSC by privacy researchers and practitioners, we are releasing PSC as free, open-source software, available for download at http://safecounting.com/.
Evaluation
Experiments are carried out on 8 to 32 core AMD Opteron machines with 32GB to 528GB of RAM running Linux kernel 3.10.0. Our implementation of PSC is currently single-threaded. Although the computational cost of PSC's noise generation is significant and may be done by the CPs before the inputs are received, we parallelize it so that it can be done on multicore machines after inputs are received . We use "parallel for" from the golang par package 2 for this parallel noise shuffling.
We instantiate all CPs and DPs on our 8 to 32 core servers. Google Protocol Buffers [50] is used for serializing messages, which are communicated over TLS connections between PSC's parties. We use Go's default crypto/tls package to implement TLS.
Query and dataset. We evaluate PSC by considering the query:
what is the number of unique IP connections as observed by the nodes in an anonymity network? Rather than store 2 32 (or, for IPv6, 2 128 ) counters, we assume b counters (where b ≪ 2 32 ) and map IP addresses to a (lg b)-bit digest by considering the first lg b bits of a hash function; this results in some loss of accuracy due to collisions. For each experiment, we chose an integer uniformly at random from the range [0, 20000]. Then for each DP, we choose from its counters a random subset of that size to set to 1; the remaining counters are set to 0.
We note that the performance of PSC is independent of the number of unique IPs. Therefore, in our performance evaluation, 12 we are interested in how the number of counters b affects the operation of PSC, rather than the number of unique IPs.
Experimental setup. The default values for the number of bins b, the number of CPs m, the number of DPs d, ϵ, and δ are listed in Table 1 .
We determine these default values by considering which values would be appropriate for an anonymity network such as Tor. Currently, Tor reports 2 million user connections 3 and over 2, 000 guard nodes 4 . Assuming that 1% of Tor guards deploy PSC, we have d = 20. Also, given this level of PSC deployment, we would expect a Tor guard to see approximately 20, 000 unique IPs.
To measure the aggregate with high accuracy, we limit hashtable collisions to at most a fraction f of inputs in expectation by using a hash table of size 1/f times the number of inputs. Therefore, for f = 10%, we set (unless otherwise specified) b = 200, 000 in all our experiments. We set ϵ = 0.3 as this is currently recommended for safe measurements in anonymity networks such as Tor [30] . To limit to 10 −6 the chance of a privacy "failure" affecting any of 10 6 users, we set δ to 10 −12 [17] . We set these default values as system-wide parameters, unless otherwise indicated.
Accuracy. The trade-off between accuracy and privacy is governed by the choice of ϵ and δ . We vary ϵ from 0.2 to 0.6, keeping the number of bins at b = 200, 000. We found that values below 0.2 produced too much noise and offered low utility. Values of ϵ greater than 0.6 would not provide a reasonable level of privacy.
The actual and the noisy aggregate values along with the standard deviation for the noisy aggregates (the noise follows a binomial distribution) for different values of ϵ is shown in Table 2 . We observe that the standard deviation of the noisy value is at most 106.44. Therefore, the noisy aggregates are very close to the actual aggregates, as expected. In summary, PSC gives highly accurate results for the desired privacy level.
Communication cost. PSC incurs communication overhead by transmitting symmetric-key-encrypted counters between the DPs and CPs and the ElGamal encrypted counters among the CPs. To be practical, a statistics gathering system should impose a low communication overhead for the DPs, which can have limited available bandwidth. However, we envision the CPs to be well-resourced dedicated servers that can sustain at least moderate communication costs.
We explore PSC's communication costs by varying the number of bins b, the number of CPs m, the number of DPs d, and ϵ. The 3 Tor uses simple statistical techniques to roughly estimate the number of users using the network. A major motivation of our work is to provide a more robust and accurate method of determining the size of Tor's user base. 4 See https://metrics.torproject.org/. Figure 3 and Figure 4 . We omit error bars as the variance in the communication cost incurred among the CPs was negligible; the same is true for the variance in communication cost among the DPs.
We first consider how the number of bins influences communication cost. We run PSC, varying b from 100,000 to 500,000, and plot the results in Figure 3 We next consider how m, the number of CPs, affects the communication cost. We vary m from 3 to 7 and plot the results in Figure 3 . The communication cost for the DPs increases at a much slower pace than that for the CPs. Even up to 7 CPs, the communication cost for each DP is fairly modest -approximately 60 MB (or 16.67 KBps, if run every hour).
The communication costs increase at a much faster pace for the CPs as each CP broadcasts proofs and ciphertexts to the other CPs. Therefore, for up to 5 CPs, each CP requires a modest bandwidth of 954.20 MB for sending and 1.11 GB for receiving (if run hourly, approximately 308 KBps).
We rerun PSC with different numbers of DPs. Figure 3 shows that varying the number of DPs has little effect on the average communication costs for the DPs and the CPs. This is because the number of encrypted counters transmitted by the DPs and the number of ElGamal encrypted counters transmitted by the CPs remain the same across these experiments. 5 Lastly, we run PSC with different values of ϵ to determine how the choice of privacy parameter affects the communication costs. Figure 4 shows that the average communication costs for the CPs decrease when ϵ is increased. The communication costs for the CPs are reasonable even for a low value of ϵ = 0.2. On average, each CP requires a bandwidth of at most 1.13 GB for sending and 1.29 GB for receiving (358 Kbps, if performed once an hour).
In summary, we find that PSC incurs reasonable communication overhead: the costs to DPs are modest, and, while slightly higher for CPs, they remain practical.
Overall runtime and computation cost. To understand the computation costs of PSC, we perform a series of microbenchmarks. We focus on evaluation of the CPs, as the DPs simply increment a counter whenever they observe a client connection. That is, the computation overhead of a DP is negligible. 5 Currently, in our implementation, for all the above communication experiments, the DPs send the symmetric key share for each counter to every CP. We note that as a future optimization, this can be reduced to a great extent by using a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) and just sending a key per CP. The CPs can then use the PRF to generate the key-shares for every counter. We expect that this will reduce the communication cost of the DPs to half of the observed value. We observe that the time taken for each operation of the CPs (including public key generation, parallel noise generation, ElGamal encryption, verifiable shuffling, re-randomization and reencryption, and decryption) takes less than 3% of the total time taken in a run of the protocol. This is because the time required to transfer messages via secure broadcast overwhelms the time required for computation. Figure 5 shows the overall running time (including the time required for network communication) as a function of the number of bins b and the number of CPs m. We first consider how number of bins b affects the computation cost (note that more data must be communicated via secure broadcast as b increases). The overall runtime is moderate. It takes approximately 1 hr 6 min for an experiment with 62,500 bins.
We next consider how the number of CPs m affects the computation cost. The computation cost increases with the CPs at a slower pace than with the bins. Even up to 6 CPs, the average computation cost for each CP is fairly modest -approximately 4 hr 9 min.
Still, to better understand the computational overhead of PSC, we measure the computation time as we vary the number of bins b. Figure 6 shows the distribution of processing overheads for the CPs for different operations, which account for less than 3% of the total execution time.
RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving measurements. The operators of distributed systems have a critical need to understand how their systems are being used. The most straightforward measurement technique is to directly log and analyze the metric of interest. In the context of privacy-preserving systems, such as anonymity networks, this approach can be problematic, and attempts that directly measure user behavior in anonymity networks [37] have been heavily criticized. In particular, Soghoian [46] has called for improved community standards for research on anonymity networks. Loesing et al. [35] reiterate this need and propose privacy-preserving techniques for identifying trends in Tor. The techniques they describe for unique counting are to aggregate and round unique observations made at each relay. These techniques are not as safe as PSC, in that they only perform aggregate over time and not across relays, they require intermediate observations to be stored in memory, and they do not satisfy any rigorous privacy definition. Some of these techniques are also heuristic, as they indirectly observe client activity (e.g. directory downloads) and must guess how much activity corresponds to a unique user.
Recently, several measurement techniques have been proposed for Tor that use differential privacy to protect user privacy. Here, the goal is to produce useful aggregate statistics about the anonymity network, while providing quantifiable privacy guarantees. Elahi et al. [19] introduce secret-sharing and distributed-encryption variants of PrivEx, a system for private traffic statistics collection for anonymity networks. The PrivCount system, which serves as the inspiration of our work, extends PrivEx for collection of Tor statistics information, and introduces optimal allocation techniques for the ϵ privacy budget. Finally, Historϵ [36] , like PrivEx and PrivCount, use differential privacy to securely measure characteristics of the Tor network. Historϵ adds integrity protections by bounding the influence of malicious data collectors (or, in our terminology, DPs). These systems can aggregate counts across nodes, but they cannot compute unique counts, which is the functionality provided by PSC.
Related cryptographic protocols. Brandt suggests a protocol [5] very similar to the aggregate-shuffle-rerandomize-decrypt scheme our CPs execute. However, our construction differs in a few crucial parts: we need to include separate DP parties to provide the input that must be adaptively secure and limit as much as possible their computational work, and in our protocol the parties jointly generate noise to satisfy a differential privacy guarantee. Beyond these modifications, the bulk of our contribution is a thorough proof of security of the protocol in the UC model (to make the proof go through, we needed to add re-encryption during the re-randomization phase), a specific application for the general theoretical protocol (making measurements in privacy-preserving systems like Tor), and a functional implementation of the protocol alongside empirical data measuring computation and communication costs gathered through experiments.
Several protocols to securely compute set-union cardinality (or the related problem of set-intersection cardinality) have been proposed [12, 18, 32, 48] . However, none of these provides all of the security properties that we desire for distributed measurement in a highly-adversarial setting: malicious security against a dishonest majority, forward privacy, and differentially-private output. Similar protocols have been designed to securely compute set union [22, 28] , but these protocols output every member of the union and not just its cardinality. General secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols can realize any functionality including set-union cardinality, even in the UC model [1, 7] , and recent advances in efficient MPC have been made in the multi-party, dishonest-majority setting that we require [10, 33, 34] . However, such protocols make use of a relatively expensive "offline" phase, while we intend to allow for measurements that are run on a continuous basis. We also consider a major advantage of PSC to be that it is conceptually straightforward and relies on a few well-understood tools.
Shuffles. The notion of a mixnet, which anonymizes a set of messages, was introduced by Chaum [8] , and there are many schemes for proofs of shuffles [2, 13, 23, 27, 40] , which have been developed as a fundamental primitive in privacy-preserving protocols. The first shuffles to be proved secure in the UC model are given by Wikström [51] and are designed to construct UC-secure mixnets. Mixnets and shuffling schemes have found a variety of applications, particularly anonymous communication [8, 11, 39, 49] and electronic voting [4, 29, 40] .
CONCLUSION
Administrators of distributed systems have a critical need to understand how their systems are being used. Often, instrumenting the distributed system with measurement functionality and aggregating the result is a straightforward process. However, for systems in which privacy is paramount, maintaining and aggregating statistics is a far more complex task. Incorrect solutions can pose significant risk to the system's users. This paper presents a protocol for private set-union cardinality (private set-union cardinality)-a zero-knowledge protocol for counting the unique number of items known across the system's nodes that ensures that no party can learn anything other than the cardinality. Our PSC protocol achieves private set-union cardinality using a combination of verifiable shuffles and differential privacy techniques. We formally prove the security of PSC using ideal functionalities under the UC framework.
We show that PSC can be practicality realized. Our implementation of PSC, which we release as free open-source software, demonstrates the scalability of our techniques. Running our protocol on 200,000 counters across 20 DPs with 5 CPs consumes only approximately 60 MB at each DP and approximately 2 GB traffic at each PSC-dedicated CP, making it practical for real-world deployments.
Importantly, PSC is a standalone protocol that is designed to be run alongside any distributed system in which there is a need to perform a private tabulation. As ongoing work, we are working towards deploying PSC at Tor's ingress points to discern the number of unique clients that are accessing the anonymity network. We envision that PSC is useful far beyond our own efforts, and could be applied to count unique visitors across websites, determine the number of users on a filesharing network (e.g., on a distributed hash table), quantify the number of duplicate voter registration records, among other uses.
Our implementation of PSC is available for download at http: //safecounting.com/.
Then it is easy to see that q = The simulator runs the prover as normal until it receives c, then rewinds V , selects random r 1 , r 2 and sets
Since V is an honest verifier, it, given the same randomness, provides the same challenge c and the equations required for V to verify both hold and the simulation is successful.
Figure 7: F Z K P −RR , the ideal functionality for a reencryption re-randomization ZKP
A.2 ZKP of a Re-encryption shuffle
This is the idealization of our re-encryption shuffle ZKP. This functionality has been realized in the UC model by Wikström [51] , specifically in Appendix F. We allow the functionality to take the permutation explicitly as an input for convenience.
, vector of group elements ì r , public key y and π a permutation of {1, ..., n}.
(2) Set R to 1 if, for each i, (α π (i) , β π (i) ) is a re-encryption of (A i , B i ) under public key y using random element r i . Set R to 0 otherwise. 
A.3 ZKP of Knowledge of Discrete Log
The prover wants to prove knowledge of x such that y = д x so we use the Σ−protocol described by Schnorr [44] . We describe the protocol and since it is standard we omit the proof:
(1) The Prover P selects t at random in G and sends T = д t (2) The Verifier selects a random challenge c to P. (1) Upon receiving (PROVE, x, y, P i , P j ) for x ∈ Z p , y ∈ G, set R to 1 if y = д x , 0 otherwise. (2) Send (RESULT, y, P i , P j , R) to S, P j . 
A.4 ZKP of Knowledge of Equality of Discrete Logs
Suppose we have a ciphertext pair, (A, B). We want to present (A ′ , B ′ ) and a proof that there exists some r such that A ′ = A r , B ′ = B r , or that log A A ′ = log B B ′ = r where r is known to the prover. A Σ-protocol for this proof is described by Chaum and Pedersen [9] . We describe the protocol and since it is standard we omit the proof:
(1) The Prover P selects t at random and sends
The Verifier sends a random challenge c to P. (1) Upon receiving (PROVE, ( ì A, ì B), ( ì α, ì β), x, P i , P j ) from P i , for ( ì α, ì β) a vector of ciphertext pairs and x ∈ Z p , set R to 1 if for every i, log β i α i = log B i A i = x and set R = 0 otherwise.
Figure 10: F Z K P −DLE , the ideal functionality for a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the equality of two discrete logs
A.5 Ideal Functionality for Authenticated Broadcast
We define an ideal functionality for authenticated broadcast with abort and no fairness. We use a minor modification of the protocol defined in [26] .
Broadcast with Abort
• P i has input x and sends x to all parties.
• Upon receiving a value x j from P i , party P j sends the value x j to all other parties.
• Party P j waits to receive a message from each party, and checks to see if these match the message sent by P i . If so, output this message. If not, output ABORT. This is identical to the UC secure protocol which realizes authenticated broadcast in [26] except that instead of doing nothing upon receiving mismatched messages, the parties output ABORT. The proof that the protocol above UC-realizes the ideal functionality below is almost identical to the proof given of broadcast with abort and no fairness, where the simulator instead instructs honest parties who receive mismatched values to abort through the ideal functionality instead of giving them no output. Honest parties in our protocol who receive ABORT from F BC output ABORT and terminate. 
A.6 Secure Communication
This ideal functionality directly defines our communication model between DPs and CPs, and we take it directly from Canetti [7] . 
A.7 PSC
We repeat the definition of the the ideal functionality for PSC from Figure 2 , parameterized by b, n bits of data and noise each
(4) Upon receiving GO from DP i , ignore further messages from DP i , and send (GO, DP i ) to A. (5) Upon receiving GO from CP i , ignore further messages from CP i , and send (GO, CP i ) to A.
Once GO has been received from each CP, output z to CP m . (9) If at any point F PSC receives (ABORT, IDS) from A, send ABORT to all parties indicated by IDS and do not send additional outputs besides other ABORT commands as directed by A. Figure 13 : F P SC , the Private Set-Union Cardinality ideal functionality
B PROOFS B.1 Preliminaries
We deal extensively with vectors of ciphertexts and plaintexts and write them ì v. We write an individual component k of list ì v as v k .
We assume all parties agree on a session ID which is a prefix of all messages in the protocol (or else the parties ignore them), and that they agree on the publicly known group and protocol parameters д, G, b, n.
We assume perfectly secure point to point channels described explicitly in Appendix A.6 that leak only the length of each message between each individual parties, though the only point to point communication that occurs in the protocol is directly from DPs to the CPs to submit initial and final shares, which in the implementation is protected through a symmetric encryption scheme that we choose not to model explicitly. We assume these channels are point-to-point secure and implicit in the communication model, realized through F SC and do not mention the functionality again, including it only for completeness.
While the CPs execute a single of sequence of computations with no delay during the run of the protocol, the DPs keep blind counters and collect data for some significant period of time, and may, during that time be compromised by some attacker so while we consider static corruptions to be reasonable to model the behavior of the CPs, it is an important security property of our protocol that if a DP is compromised while it is collecting data, the protocol remains correct and the privacy of the inputs up to that point remains preserved.
In order to do this we work in the erasure model and allow for the DPs to securely erase records of their behavior. So our corruption model is static corruptions with respect to the CPs, and adaptive with respect to the DPs.
B.2 Proving the simulator correct
We define the simulator S defined in Figure 14 . Fix a probabilistic polynomial time environment Z and assume a dummy adversary A. S runs a copy of A and simulates the other parties for A's benefit, forwarding messages from Z to its simulated A and back. We define CP h to be the last honest CP. We note that S has access to the randomness used for every ciphertext of the CPs as it is provided to an appropriate ZKP functionality, and that S knows the private keys for each CP (it generates the keys for the honest ones, and the corrupt ones send the private keys to F DL to prove they are not related to previous keys).
In the following when we say CP h 'decrypts' a vector of plaintexts ì P we mean that CP h takes the first component in each vector presented to it, α i and broadcasts a vector of the pairs:
or if h = m, a vector of (α i , д p i ) and proves this operation correct by instructing F DL to tell every other CP that the decryption was done correctly. We need to show that Z cannot with non negligible probability distinguish between interacting with A in the (F Z K P −RR , F Z K P −DL , F Z K P −DLE , F BC , F Z K P −S )-hybrid execution and interacting with S in an ideal execution where S has access to only F P SC .
We define the following sequence of (sequences of) hybrid executions which each run Z and output the output of Z . We assume a dummy adversary A and prove there is no PPT algorithm Z which Simulation of Aborts. Simulation of aborts: if at any time, an honest CP aborts, the simulator must send (ABORT, id) to F P SC where id is the identity of the aborting party.
Extraction. Set CP h as the last honest CP. S instructs every ZKP functionality to respond to any proof attempt by CP h with 1, indicating the proof was correct. S runs simulated honest DPs honestly, and since they are not connected to the environment Z they receive no INCREMENT instructions and so always input 0. When S receives (GO, DP i ) for some honest DP i , DP i proceeds as if it had received GO from Z . CP h submits an encryption of 0 during data submission. If any party is corrupted S submits data to F P SC as follows: After the CPs have aggregated their submissions into the vector ì c, S recovers the plaintexts using the randomness submitted to F DL and combines it with the values sent to CP h by the DPs into a vector ì v sends (INCREMENT,k) to F P SC for each nonzero bin v k , then submits GO on behalf of each honest DP.
Computations. Now S waits for F P SC to output its result r and recovers it, and delays any messages from F P SC to other parties besides aborts. For the remainder, the simulator deviates from running the honest participants and ideal functionalities honestly in the following ways: (1) During noise generation, instead of CP h presenting a correct re-encryption permutation of the two values, present two random encryptions of 2 (2) During re-encryption permutation, instead of CP h presenting a correct re-encryption permutation of the vector it was given, present in each bin k an encryption of k (3) During re-encryption re-randomization, instead of CP h presenting a correct re-encryption re-randomization of the vector it was given, present in each bin k an encryption of k (4) During decryption, generate a fake vector ì f of exponential ElGamal plaintexts with r uniformly random nonzero elements, then (b + n) − r zeros. Generate a uniformly random permutation π and set ì f = π ( ì f ).
Then if h = m, present ì f on behalf of CP h . Otherwise, for each bin k, write the first component of bin k of the vector presented to CP h as α k , write x i as the private key of CP i sent to F DL during key generation and present the following vector of ciphertexts: for each component k, present can distinguish between each adjacent pair of hybrids with nonnegligible probability.
B.2.1 Aborts. If any honest SK aborts at any phase in the protocol, the future phases do not take place and the view of Z terminates in the ideal execution, (F Z K P −RR , F Z K P −DL , F Z K P −DLE , F BC , F Z K P −S )-hybrid execution, and every intermediate hybrid machine: in the hybrid execution, the honest CP terminates, and in the ideal execution S observes this behavior and sends an appropriate ABORT message to F P SC , terminating the protocol. Then in the following discussion, we consider only executions where Z does not behave in a manner which causes an abort, and note that any execution where Z does is a prefix of the one we consider below where the protocol completes; then by showing two protocol-completing hybrids are indistinguishable, we can infer two equal-length prefixes of them are indistinguishable as well.
We define a sequence of hybrids. First let D 0 be the (F Z K P −RR , The difference between these two hybrids is that the incrementing of bin i + 1 is done by honest DPs in D i and sent to CP h to forward during data submission and is done by an honest CP h directly in D i+1 , but communication between these two parties is perfectly secure so that if only honest DPs which are never corrupted increment bin i + 1, this is simply a view change.
If no honest DP is instructed to increment bin i + 1, D i and D i+1 are defined identically.
So consider the case that some honest DP j has been corrupted after it has incremented bin i + 1.
We can assume without loss of generality Z knows the shares in bin i + 1 from DP j for every CP besides CP h 's first share from DP j . Call this share s h and suppose again without loss of generality that Z has corrupted DP j before it submits its second shares so that Z may select them instead of after where it may simply observe them.
While Z only ever observes the encrypted submission of CP h , we prove something stronger: that the plaintext p of the value submitted by CP h in both hybrids is identically distributed.
We show directly that every value in Z p is equally likely to be submitted by CP h in both hybrids. Consider D i and fix some k ∈ Z q . CP h submits in this hybrid p = s h + s ′ h where s h is its original blind share, and s ′ h is the final one selected by Z . s h is generated by an honest DP, sent securely to CP h . In this case by assumption the honest DP has incremented its blind counter T j i+1 and securely erased everything but this so T j i+1 is random and independent from each blind share, including s h . Therefore s ′ h is selected by Z with no knowledge about s h : Z knows the sum of s h and original value of T j i+1 , but has no information about either individual quantity. So the likelihood CP h submits k is the probability that s h = k − s ′ h with s h random, which is 1 are indistinguishable from each other. We define the following modified IND-CPA game and follow the method described by Shoup [45] . Since this game allows the adversary to control a portion of the public key, it is not exactly the standard IND-CPA game for ElGamal so we provide a direct proof. Now we note if (η, ν, ρ) is a DDH tuple, then α, β is an encryption of m b for some random b just as in Game 1, whereas if (η, ν, ρ) is not a DDH tuple, β is uniformly random and independent from b since ρ is, which means any algorithm playing this game has zero advantage. So for uniformly random independent z 1 , z 2 , z 3 :
where ϵ is negligible for any algorithm A by the DDH assumption. And in particular for A = δ this gives |P(S 1 ) − 1/2| is negligible.
Lemma B.3. If there exists some Z that has non negligible advantage distinguishing between D 2 i and D 2 i+1 , there exists an adversary for Game 1 which has non-negligible advantage.
We play Game 1. Our distinguisher accepts y 1 from Game 1 and is expected to produce y 2 . It begins the protocol, broadcasting y 1 as the public key of CP h , and lets
so that y in Game 1 is the joint shared public key for the protocol execution.
Then give m 0 ← 0, m 1 ← p i+1 as defined above to the challenger in Game 1 and submit (α, β) as the submission for CP h for bin i + 1.
Then we respond to the challenger in Game 1 with the response of Z in the protocol execution. We note that if b = 0, Z is interacting with D 2 i whereas if b = 1, Z is interacting with D 2 i+1 . So Z 's advantage in distinguishing the two hybrids is equal to our advantage in Game 1, which must be negligible.
The decrypted value in both hybrids is p k or the same encryption of it.
So we have a sequence of hybrids We play Game 1 and consider a hybrid which only changes the first bin, N ′ i+1 : As before, set y 1 as the public key of CP h , and give the challenger y 2 so that the joint public key in the execution is y in Game 1. Then set m 0 = 2, and set m 1 as the plaintext in the first ciphertext given to CP h for noise generation bit i +1. Then replace the first ciphertext with α, β from the challenger in Game 1. Output the output of Z .
We note that if b = 1, then this is identically
with nonnegligible probability, we have constructed an adversary for Game 1 which succeeds with non-negligible probability which contradicts lemma B.2.
Then consider the transition from N ′ i to N i+1 . We play the identical game but replace the second bin as well and the argument is identical, so that we have a sequence: N i , N ′ i , N i+1 of hybrids which are adjacentwise indistinguishable for every i, so we have a sequence of hybrids:
.., N n B.2.5 Noise Bins 2. We define the following hybrid which independently generates the noise bits according to a fixed distribution independent of Z during decryption. More specifically, N 2 n is defined exactly as N n except as follows:
formly in {0, 1}. Then on behalf of CP h present an encryption of b k q 1 q 2 ...q m to the remaining CPs where q i is the re-randomization factor provided by CP i . The determination of the plaintext in each execution is done by random selection independent of Z with the same distribution:
In N n we select, for each k, π h R ← {(1), (12)} (where we define permutations in cyclic notation) and in N 2 n we select b k R ← {0, 1}. Fix the parity of the number s of non-identity permutations selected by Z for a given noise bin k in a given execution. Then if s = 0, selecting π h = (1) is selecting b k = 0, whereas selecting π h = (12) is selecting b k = 1, and if s = 1 the choices are reversed. The distributions in each case are identical, which is the only difference between N n and N 2 n .
B.2.6 Permutation. We define the following sequence of hybrids for 1 ≤ i ≤ b + n where we replace each permutation ciphertext with a dummy ciphertext. More specifically, P i is defined exactly as N 2 n except as follows:
(1) During re-encryption permutation for CP h , generate a permutation π h and for bins k ≤ i, replace the ciphertext in bin k with a random encryption of k. For bins k > i permute and re-encrypt honestly according to π h . (2) During decryption for CP h , for bins k ≤ i calculate the final plaintexts as if π h were applied to the ciphertexts by CP h . Decrypt these values on behalf of CP h . Figure 21 : P i , hybrids where the permutations are simulated
Lemma B.6. If there exists some Z that has non negligible advantage distinguishing between P i and P i+1 , there exists an adversary for Game 1 which has non-negligible advantage.
Fix an i and suppose there exists such a Z . We play Game 1. Receive y 1 from the challenger in Game 1 and present it as the public key of CP h . Give y 2 as the joint public key of the remaining CPs so that y in Game 1 is the joint public key for the protocol. Run the protocol as in N 2 n until the re-encryption permutation for CP h . Select a random permutation π h and determine the vector v an honest CP h would present as a re-encryption permutation. Set m 0 = v i+1 where v i+1 is the plaintext in bin i + 1 of vector v. Set m 1 = i + 1. Generate the vector for CP h to broadcast defined componentwise as follows: For components k < i + 1, present a random encryption of k. For component i + 1, present α, β from the challenger in Game 1. For k > i + 1, present an encryption of v k as in N 2 n . During decryption, calculate the plaintext that would have been generated using re-randomization factors q 1 , ..., q m and the permutations and re-encryption factors provided by all other CPs and π h . Present the encryption of these plaintexts for the remaining CPs (or the plaintexts, if m = h) and give the challenger in Game 1 the output of Z . Now only the value in bin i + 1 changes, and that if b in Game 1 is 0, then α, β is the correct value for bin i + 1 for an honestly generated re-encryption permutation, so this is exactly the value in bin i + 1 for P i . If b in Game 1 is 1, then it is an encryption of i + 1 which is exactly the value for bin i + 1 in P i+1 .
Then if Z can distinguish between P i and P i+1 with non negligible advantage, then the scheme above is an adversary for Game 1 with non negligible advantage, which is a contradiction by Lemma B.2.
So we have the sequence of hybrids: N 2 n = P 0 , P 1 , ..., P b+n which are adjacentwise indistinguishable.
B.2.7 Permutation 2. Now we define the hybrid P 2 b+n which generates a permutation at random independent from the view of Z to apply to the plaintexts. More specifically, P 2 b+n is defined exactly as P b+n except as follows:
(1) During decryption, sort all of the plaintexts in the vector presented to CP h , then shuffle them according to a random permutation π h . (2) For each bin, present an encryption of the shuffled plaintexts behalf of CP h to the remaining CPs Figure 22 : P 2 , permutation view-change hybrids
In P b+n CP h submits no information about any permutation to Z since all the values are dummy values. More explicitly, consider the composed permutation of the plaintexts in both hybrids.
In P b+n , the permutation is some composition π P 1 = π 1 • π h • π 2 where without loss Z has selected π 1 , π 2 (letting π 1 or π 2 be the identity if h = 1 or h = m), and π h is random.
Whereas in P 2 b+n , the permutation is π P 2 = π s • π where π s is the permutation which sorts the plaintexts, then π is random.
Lemma B.7. π P 1 and π P 2 are identically distributed.
Each permutation π is selected in P 2 b+n with probability 1 (b+n)! and for each π there exists a unique π h such that π P 1 = π P 2 :
Every permutation is invertible so we let
and note that the probability this π h is selected in P b+n is 1
which is the same as in P 2 b+n .
Corollary B.8. P b+n and P 2 b+n are identically distributed
Since only these permutations are changed between P b+n , P 2 b+n and the permutations are identically distributed, the hybrids themselves are identically distributed.
B.2.8 Re-randomization. We define the following sequence of hybrids for 1 ≤ i ≤ b + n which replace each ciphertext during re-randomization with a dummy. More specifically, R i is defined exactly as P 2 b+n except as follows: We let R 0 = P 2 b+n . Lemma B.9. If there exists some Z that has non negligible advantage distinguishing between R i and R i+1 , there exists an adversary for Game 1 which has non-negligible advantage.
Fix i. Then as before we play Game 1.
R i
(1) During re-randomization for CP h , for k ≤ i, replace the ciphertext in bin k with a random encryption of k. (2) During decryption for CP h , for i ≤ k, calculate the expected decryption using the correct values and rerandomization factors q 1 ...q m and decrypt these on behalf of CP h . Figure 23 : R i , hybrids where rerandomization-reencryption is simulated
Our Re-encryption Re-randomization ZKP allows for an adversary to select q = 0 and present a proof that verifies correctly. But if Z selects q = 0 for any q, it must broadcast a pair of the form:
and that if this is observed by any honest CP, that CP executes ABORT. We present y 1 from Game 1 as the public key of CP h , and set y 2 as the product of the public keys for the other CPs. During re-randomization for CP h , for bins k where k < i + 1, present a random encryption of k. For bin i + 1, find the plaintext p i+1 in bin i + 1, select a uniformly random q h 0 and set m 0 in Game 1 as p i+1 q h . Set m 1 as i + 1, and present α, β from Game 1 as bin i + 1. Then for k > i + 1, present a correct reencryptionrerandomization of the ciphertext in bin k.
If b = 0 in Game 1, then the value in bin i + 1 is:
for r ′ uniformly random. We claim this is a uniformly randomly selected re-encryption re-randomization of the previous value (д r , д r x +p i +1 ). This means it has the form:
(д (r +s)q , д (r +s)qx +qp i +1 )
for random s, q 0. For random r ′ , q h 0 we show that there exist unique s, q which satisfy this form. Set q = q h , then set r ′ = (r + s)q so that s = r ′ q −1 − r . Then it is easy to see the ciphertext (д r ′ , д r ′ x +p i +1 q h ) = (д (r +s)q , д (r +s)qx +qp i +1 )
which is a valid re-encryption re-randomization using parameters q, s. Since q = q h they are selected identically, and we consider s. It is easy to see each s defines a unique r ′ by the linear mapping defined above and so we conclude for each pair (q, r ′ ) with q 0, there is a unique pair (q h , s) with q h 0 so we conclude (α, β) in this case is a uniformly random re-encryption re-randomization of the previous value if b = 0 so this is R i .
Then if b = 1, (α, β) is an encryption of i + 1 exactly as in R i+1 . We respond to the challenger in Game 1 with the output of Z and conclude the advantage of Z in distinguishing between R i , R i+1 is equal to the advantage in Game 1 defined above, and so must be negligible.
B.2.9 Re-randomization 2. We define the hybrid which selects uniformly random elements to replace each nonzero plaintext during decryption independent from the view of Z . More specifically, R 2 b+n is defined exactly as R b+n except as follows: In R b+n , the re-randomization factor for CP h , q h , is selected during decryption completely independent of the view of Z up until that point. For every k in the final vector, note that if the plaintext in k is 0, R b+n and R 2 b+n are identical. Otherwise, we compare selecting the final plaintext p k randomly to selecting it based on a correct re-randomization. We know each re-randomization factor q i is not zero: honest CPs never select zero, and if a dishonest CP presents a re-randomization with 0, all the honest CPs abort. So the final plaintext in this case is q 1 q h q 2 with q 1 , q 2 selected by Z , possibly 1 if h = 1 or h = m. Then for any nonzero randomly selected plaintext p k there is a unique nonzero q h so that q 1 q h q 2 = p k which is easy to see that for every p k , there is a unique q h = (q 1 q 2 ) −1 p k so that a random selection of is identical to a random selection of the other and the final plaintexts in each hybrid are identically distributed, which is the only difference between R b+n , R 2 b+n B.2.10 Ideal Model. All of the behavior in R 2 b+n is exactly what is done by the simulator except S does not have access to the increments given to the honest DPs and instead must get this value combined with the noise from F P SC . Recall that the output of F P SC is the componentwise OR of the increments given by the honest DPs, and ì v s which is the plaintexts submitted by corrupt DPs and CPs as extracted from the vector of submissions ì c. However when an honest DP increments a bin in the ideal execution, F P SC records this bin as nonzero regardless of any other behavior while in the hybrid R 2 b+n it is possible for honest DPs to increment some bin and then have this reversed by corrupt CPs and DPs, so that the bin is 0 in the R 2 b+n and nonzero in the ideal execution. We show this happens with negligible probability.
We define I , the final hybrid. More specifically, I is defined exactly as R 2 b+n except as follows:
Lemma B.11. I outputs FAIL with negligible probability By construction, h k is the inputs given to CP h by the DPs along with a value v generated by CP h . But no information about v is ever revealed or used until the decryption phase, which occurs after I chooses whether or not to output FAIL. Then for I to output FAIL, Z I (1) Record externally every increment instruction given to an honest DP. If some honest DP receives an increment instruction for some bin k, and during data submission the sum for that bin combined with h k is 0, output FAIL. Figure 25 : I , a hybrid where data submission and aggregation is perfect must guess a value v from which its view is statistically independent, so this happens with probability 1 |Z q | which is negligible.
Lemma B.12. The execution of I conditioned on not outputting FAIL is distributed identically to the view of Z interacting with S in the ideal model.
The number of nonzero bins calculated by F P SC is now calculated identically to the number in I , since no incremented bin saved by F P SC by some honest DP is later reduced to 0 (this triggers a FAIL output). So this is identically the execution with S in the ideal model. Theorem B.13. The PSC protocol defined in section 4 UC-realizes the ideal functionality F P SC in the (F Z K P −RR , F Z K P −DL , F Z K P −DLE , F Z K P −S , F BC )-hybrid model with point to point secure communication if at least one CP is honest and no CP is corrupted adaptively.
I is a hybrid which is, conditioned on a negligible event FAIL not occurring, identical to S interacting with Z in the ideal execution, and D 0 is the (F RR , F DL , F DLE , F BC , F RS )-hybrid execution and we have a finite sequence of hybrids D 0 , ..., I which are all adjacentwise either identically distributed or computationally indistinguishable.
